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growth and rm size due to EMS. Although monetary policy has no long-run e¤ect
on economic growth, an increase in the nominal interest rate permanently reduces
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1 Introduction
In this study, we develop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model to explore the e¤ects of
monetary policy on economic growth, social welfare and endogenous market structure (EMS).
In contrast to previous studies with exogenous market structure, we nd that monetary policy
has only transitory, not permanent, e¤ects on the rate of economic growth. Specically, we
nd that although an increase in the nominal interest rate, accompanied by an increase in the
money growth rate, reduces the level of output on the balanced growth path, it has no e¤ect
on the steady-state growth rate. In other words, money is superneutral with respect to the
growth rate of output but not to the level of output in accordance with empirical evidence;
see for example Fisher and Seater (1993), King and Watson (1997) and Bullard (1999).
The reason for this result is that the economys market structure responds endogenously
to changes in labor supply induced by monetary policy. In other words, market structure,
measured by the market size of each rm, is endogenously determined through the entry
and exit of rms in response to macroeconomic conditions. More importantly, each rms
incentives to invest in R&D depend on the size of its market, which is determined by market
structure but not aggregate market size.
To capture EMS and R&D in a dynamic framework, we use a variant of the second-
generation R&D-based growth model, pioneered by Peretto (1998), Young (1998), Howitt
(1999) and Segerstrom (2000). To our knowledge, this is the rst analysis of monetary
policy in the second-generation R&D-based growth model. The second-generation R&D-
based growth model realistically features two dimensions of technological progress: variety
expansion (i.e., horizontal innovation) and quality improvement (i.e., vertical innovation). In
the horizontal dimension, entrepreneurs create new rms by introducing new products, and
the number of rms in equilibrium determines two important elements of market structure:
market concentration and rm size. In the vertical dimension, each incumbent rm performs
in-house R&D to improve the quality of its products, and the return to in-house R&D is
determined by the market size of the rm. In this economy, technological progress and
market structure are jointly determined in equilibrium: market structure is measured by
rmsmarket size, whereas technological progress is determined by the growth rate of vertical
innovation. One advantage of the second-generation R&D-based growth model is that it is
consistent with empirical facts in the industrial organization (IO) literature. For example,
the return to R&D depends on rm size rather than aggregate market size; see Cohen and
Klepper (1996a,b). Furthermore, theoretical implications of the second-generation R&D-
based growth model with EMS are supported by empirical studies, such as Laincz and
Peretto (2006) and Ha and Howitt (2007).
In this growth-theoretic framework, an increase in the nominal interest rate1 reduces labor
supply via a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on consumption and gives rise to interesting
transitional dynamic e¤ects. In the short run, the reduction in labor supply caused by a
higher nominal interest rate reduces average rm size and the growth rates of innovation,
output and consumption.2 Intuitively, when the nominal interest rate increases, households
1In this study, the nominal interest rate is a policy instrument chosen by the monetary authority. However,
one could consider an alternative analysis by having the monetary authority choosing the money growth rate.
2For example, Evers et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence for a negative e¤ect of ination and the
nominal interest rate on total factor productivity growth.
2
decrease consumption and increase leisure due to an extra cost of consumption imposed by
the CIA constraint. As a result, the reduced supply of labor causes lower employment per
rm on the transition path, which in turn reduces economic growth temporarily. In the long
run, an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the steady-state equilibrium number of
rms but has no e¤ect on economic growth and rm size due to the endogeneity of market
structure. Intuitively, some rms exit the market as a result of the smaller aggregate market
size measured by the supply of labor, and the number of rms adjusts such that employment
per rm in the steady state returns to the initial level. Therefore, long-run economic growth
is independent of the nominal interest rate. Although monetary policy has no long-run
e¤ect on economic growth, an increase in the nominal interest rate permanently reduces the
levels of output, consumption and employment. Furthermore, taking into account transition
dynamics, we nd that social welfare is decreasing in the nominal interest rate. Intuitively,
the supply of labor is suboptimally low in equilibrium, so that a positive nominal interest
rate that reduces labor supply is suboptimal. Given the zero lower bound on the nominal
interest rate, a zero nominal interest rate maximizes social welfare, and hence, the Friedman
rule is optimal in this economy.3 To our knowledge, this is the rst analytical derivation
of optimal monetary policy that takes into account transition dynamics in the R&D-based
growth model.
This study relates to the literature on ination and economic growth;4 see Tobin (1965)
and Stockman (1981) for seminal studies and Wang and Yip (1992) for a discussion on
di¤erent approaches of modelling money demand. A common approach of modelling money
demand in this literature is through a CIA constraint on consumption; see for example
Gomme (1993), Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and Mino (1997). In this study, we follow this
approach to model money demand. Studies in this literature often analyze the growth and
welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in variants of the overlapping generations model or the
Neoclassical growth model. For example, Wu and Zhang (2001) also analyze the e¤ects of
ination on the number of rms and rm size in a Neoclassical growth model; however, they
do not consider R&D-driven economic growth and transition dynamics. Our study takes into
consideration these elements and relates to a more recent subbranch of the literature that
analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy in R&D-based growth models;
see for example, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), Funk and Kromen (2010), Chu and Cozzi
(2013), Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu et al. (2012). These studies consider either the variety-
expanding model or the quality-ladder model. The present study di¤ers from them by
analyzing the e¤ects of monetary policy in a second-generation R&D-based growth model
in which market structure is endogenous and responds to monetary policy. In other words,
we consider a Schumpeterian growth model with EMS; see Peretto (1996, 1999) for seminal
studies in R&D-based growth models with EMS and Etro (2012) for an excellent textbook
treatment. This study contributes to the literature with a novel analysis of monetary policy
on economic growth and market structure in an R&D-based growth model and also provides
a novel result that the long-run e¤ects of monetary policy in an R&D-based growth model
with EMS are reected in the economys market structure and the level of output rather than
the growth rate of output. This theoretical result has an important empirical implication
3See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) for a discussion of the Friedman rule.
4Gillman and Kejak (2005) provide a survey of this literature.
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that money is superneutral with respect to the growth rate of output but not to the level of
output in accordance with the empirical evidence discussed above.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary Schum-
peterian growth model with EMS. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy on
economic growth and social welfare. The nal section concludes.
2 A monetary Schumpeterian growth model with EMS
Our growth-theoretic framework is based on the Schumpeterian model with in-house R&D
and EMS in Peretto (2007, 2011). We introduce money demand into the model via the
Lucasian approach of a CIA constraint on consumption as in Lucas (1980).5 As in standard
CIA models, monetary policy a¤ects the economy by distorting householdstradeo¤between
consumption and leisure. In our analysis, we provide a complete closed-form solution for the
economys transition dynamics as well as its balanced growth path.
2.1 Households
There is a representative household, who has the following lifetime utility function:
U =
1Z
0
e t lnutdt =
1Z
0
e t[ln ct +  ln(L  lt)]dt, (1)
where ct denotes consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t and lt denotes labor
supply. The parameters  > 0 and  > 0 determine respectively subjective discounting and
leisure preference. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation:6
_at + _mt = rtat + wtlt +  t   ct   tmt. (2)
Monopolistic intermediate goods rms are owned by the household, and the value of rms
shares is at.7 The real rate of return on at is rt, which we will refer to as the real interest
rate.8 The household has a labor endowment of L units and elastically supplies lt units to
earn a real wage rate wt. The household also faces a lump-sum transfer (or tax)  t from the
government. The household carries real balances mt to facilitate purchases of consumption
goods.9 The cost of holding money is the ination rate t. The CIA constraint is given by
5We do not consider other CIA constraints in this study in order to focus on the consumption-leisure
tradeo¤, which is an important channel through which monetary policy a¤ects economic growth in the
literature. See Chu and Cozzi (2013) for an analysis of CIA constraints on production and R&D investment.
6We also impose the usual no-Ponzi game condition that requires the households lifetime budget con-
straint to be satised.
7Final goods rms make zero prot, so their ownership is not reected in the households budget.
8In the presence of real bonds (in zero net supply), the real interest rate on these bonds would equal the
real rate of return on at.
9In this study, we focus on a single type of money, namely currency. See for example Santomero and
Seater (1996) for an analysis of an economy with several types of money.
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ct  mt, where the parameter  > 0 determines the importance of the CIA constraint. In
the limiting case  ! 0, monetary policy would have no e¤ect on the real economy.
The optimality condition for consumption is
1
ct
= t(1 + it), (3)
where it = rt + t is the nominal interest rate and t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on
(2).10 The optimality condition for labor supply is
wt(L  lt) = ct(1 + it). (4)
The intertemporal optimality condition is
  _t
t
= rt   . (5)
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate i,11 combining (3) and (5) yields the familiar
Euler equation _ct=ct = rt   .
2.2 Final goods
Following Aghion and Howitt (2005, 2008) and Peretto (2007, 2011), we assume that nal
goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function:12
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (j)[Z

t (j)Z
1 
t lt=Nt]
1 dj, (6)
where ;  2 (0; 1) and Xt(j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; Nt].13 The productivity
of intermediate good Xt(j) depends on its quality Zt(j) and also on the average quality
Zt  1Nt
R Nt
0
Zt(j)dj of all intermediate goods capturing R&D spillovers.14 From prot max-
imization, the equilibrium wage rate is determined by
wt = (1  )Yt=lt, (7)
10There is also a co-state variable on the CIA constraint, and we have substituted out this co-state variable
using the rst-order conditions in order to derive (3).
11Given that the nominal interest rate is exogenously chosen by the monetary authority, the ination rate
endogenously responds to changes in the real interest rate.
12Peretto (2007, 2011) consider a slightly di¤erent production function that replaces lt=Nt by lx;t(j),
which denotes labor that uses intermediate goods Xt(j). Given that lx;t(j) = lt=Nt in equilibrium, we follow
Aghion and Howitt (2005, 2008) to use the more direct specication lt=Nt, which has the advantage of
being generalizable. Peretto (2013) considers a more general specication lt=Nt , where  2 (0; 1) inversely
measures the social return to varieties. Our result of superneutrality of monetary policy with respect to
economic growth is robust to this generalization. Derivations are available upon request.
13There is no capital in the production function. Instead, one can treat intermediate goods as capital that
depreciates instantaneously, which is a common treatment in this type of models; see Peretto (2007, 2011).
14Here the average quality Zt captures in a simple way R&D spillovers across rms; see for example Ja¤e
(1986) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989) for empirical evidence.
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and the conditional demand function for Xt(j) is
Xt(j) =


pt(j)
1=(1 )
Zt (j)Z
1 
t lt=Nt, (8)
where pt(j) denotes the price of Xt(j) denominated in units of Yt. The demand for type-j
intermediate goods depends on the market size of each rm measured by lt=Nt. The number
of rms and the market size of each rm are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Perfect
competition implies that nal goods producers pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(j)Xt(j)dj to intermediate
goods rms.
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods Xt(j) for
j 2 [0; Nt]. Each type of intermediate goods is produced by a single monopolistic rm that
has price-setting power. Thus, the number of intermediate goods Nt is the same as the
number of rms that produce them. There are two types of R&D, vertical and horizontal.
Vertical R&D is quality improvement, carried out by incumbent rms in an attempt to
increase the demand for their products. This formulation is consistent with the empirical
facts in the IO literature that most R&D is done by incumbents; see for example Dosi (1988)
for a survey. Horizontal R&D is the invention of new products, carried out by entrepreneurs
who enter the market as new rms producing the newly invented goods. Through the entry
of rms, the number of rms and the market size of each rm are determined endogenously
in equilibrium.
2.3.1 Incumbents
Existing intermediate goods rms produce di¤erentiated goods with a technology that re-
quires one unit of nal goods to produce one unit of intermediate goods. Following Peretto
(2007), we assume that the rm in industry j incurs Zt (j)Z
1 
t units of nal goods as a
xed operating cost. This specication implies that managing facilities are more expensive
to operate in a technologically more advanced environment. To improve the quality of its
products, the rm invests Rt(j) units of nal goods in R&D. The innovation process is
_Zt(j) = Rt(j). (9)
The prot ow of rm j is
Ft(j) = [pt(j)  1]Xt(j)  Zt (j)Z1 t , (10)
and the dividend ow is
t(j) = Ft(j) Rt(j), (11)
which is distributed to the household who owns the rm. The value of the monopolistic rm
in industry j is
Vt(j) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
rsds

u(j)du. (12)
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Taking the conditional demand function (8) as given, the rm sets its own price and de-
votes resources to in-house R&D to maximize Vt(j). The current-value Hamiltonian for this
optimization problem is15
Ht(j) = t(j) + qt(j) _Zt(j). (13)
Following the standard approach in this class of models, we consider a symmetric equilibrium
in which Zt(j) = Zt for j 2 [0; Nt].16 The return to in-house R&D is increasing in the market
size of each rm measured by employment per rm lt=Nt. This property is consistent with
the empirical facts in the IO literature discussed in the introduction.
Lemma 1 The return to in-house R&D is given by17
rIt = 

(1+)=(1 )(1  ) lt
Nt
  

. (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.3.2 Entrants
A rm that is active at time t must have been born at some earlier date. A new rm
pays a setup cost Xt(j) > 0 at time t to set up its operation and introduce a new variety
of product.18 Following the standard treatment in the literature, we assume that the new
product comes into existence with the average level of quality as existing products. We refer
to this process as entry. Suppose entry is positive (i.e., _Nt > 0). Then, the no-arbitrage
condition is19
Vt(j) = Xt(j). (15)
Under symmetry, Vt(j) = Vt, and the familiar Bellman equation implies that the return to
equity (i.e., entry) is
rEt =
t
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
, (16)
which is the usual prot rate plus the capital gain. In equilibrium, rEt must equal the real
interest rate rt, which is determined by the Euler equation in Section 2.1.
15See the Appendix for the solution of this optimization problem.
16See Peretto (1998, 1999, 2007) for a discussion of the symmetric equilibrium being a reasonable equilib-
rium concept in this class of models.
17Given that monopolistic rms are owned by the household, the return to in-house R&D must equal the
real interest rate rt. However, following the usual presentation in this class of models, we label the rate of
return to in-house R&D as rIt in order to distinguish it from the rate of return to entry r
E
t . In equilibrium,
it must be the case that rIt = r
E
t = rt because all assets are owned by the household and they must yield
the same rate of return.
18The setup cost is proportional to the new rms initial volume of output. This assumption captures
the idea that the setup cost depends on the amount of productive assets required to start production. See
Peretto (2007) for a discussion.
19It is useful to note that we have followed the standard approach in this class of models to treat entry and
exit symmetrically (i.e., the scrap value of exiting an industry is also Xt(j)). Therefore, Vt(j) = Xt(j)
always holds. Otherwise, there would be an innite number of entries or exits.
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2.4 Monetary authority
The nominal money supply is denoted by Mt, and its growth rate is t  _Mt=Mt. The real
money balance is mt = Mt=Pt, where Pt is the price of nal goods. The monetary policy
instrument that we consider is it. Given a nominal interest rate it exogenously chosen by the
monetary authority, the ination rate is endogenously determined according to t = it   rt.
Then, given t, the growth rate of the nominal money supply is endogenously determined
according to t = t + _mt=mt. On the balanced growth path, the nominal interest rate is
related to the money growth rate simply as i = r +  =  + ; therefore, it is the growth
rate of money supply that a¤ects the real economy in this model.20 The monetary authority
distributes the newly printed money to the household via a lump-sum transfer, and this
transfer has a real value of
 t = _Mt=Pt = _mt + tmt. (17)
2.5 General equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fmt; at; ct; Yt; lt; Xt(j); Rt(j)g, prices frt; wt; pt(j); Vtg
and monetary policy fitg such that the following conditions are satised:
 the household chooses fmt; at; ct; ltg to maximize utility taking frt; wt; tg as given;
 competitive nal goods rms choose flt; Xt(j)g to maximize prots taking fwt; pt(j)g
as given;
 incumbents in the intermediate goods sector choose fpt(j); Rt(j)g to maximize the
present value of prots taking frtg as given;
 entrants make entry decisions taking fVtg as given;
 the value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of the households
assets such that at = NtVt;
 the market-clearing condition of labor holds; and
 the market-clearing condition of nal goods holds.
The resource constraint on nal goods is
Yt = ct +Nt(Xt + Zt +Rt) + Xt _Nt. (18)
Substituting (8) into (6) and imposing symmetry yield the aggregate production function
Yt = 
2=(1 )Ztlt, (19)
20In contrast, a one-time change in the level of money supply a¤ects the price level and has no e¤ect on
the real economy. This is the well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
The evidence generally favors neutrality and rejects superneutrality (with respect to the level of output),
consistent with our model. See for example Fisher and Seater (1993), King and Watson (1997) and Bullard
(1999) for a discussion on the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
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which uses markup pricing pt(j) = 1=.
In the Appendix, we show that the consumption-output ratio ct=Yt jumps to a unique
and stable steady-state value, a property that greatly simplies the analysis of the transition
dynamics.
Lemma 2 The consumption-output ratio jumps to a unique and stable steady-state value
(c=Y ) = 1   + 2. (20)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given a constant nominal interest rate i and a stationary consumption-output ratio, one
can use (4) to show that the supply of labor lt also jumps to its steady-state value given by
l =

1 + (1 + i)

1 +
2
1  
 1
L. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the equilibrium supply of labor is decreasing in the nominal interest
rate i. Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate increases the cost of consumption
relative to leisure because of the CIA constraint on consumption. As a result, the household
reduces consumption and increases leisure. Given that labor supply is stationary for any
given nominal interest rate i, (19) and (20) imply that
_Zt
Zt
=
_Yt
Yt
=
_ct
ct
= rt   , (22)
where the last equality uses the Euler equation. Setting rIt = rt, one can then use (14) and
(22) to derive the equilibrium growth rate given by
gt 
_Zt
Zt
= max



(1+)=(1 )(1  ) l

Nt
  

  ; 0

, (23)
which is increasing in each rms market size measured by employment per rm l=Nt.21 The
growth rate gt is strictly positive if and only if
Nt < N  
(1+)=(1 )(1  )
+ =
l.
This inequality means that if the number of rms is below a critical level N , each rms
market size is large enough to make it protable for rms to do in-house R&D. Otherwise,
there are too many rms diluting the return to R&D. As a result, rms do not invest in
R&D, and the growth rate of vertical innovation is zero. In the Appendix, we provide the
derivations of the dynamics of Nt.22
21Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction
from this class of models that economic growth is positively related to the average rm size.
22Given the positive entry cost Xt(j) > 0, the number of rms Nt is a state variable. In other words, the
positive entry cost acts a barrier to entry and bounds _Nt (i.e., the change in the number of rms).
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Lemma 3 The growth rate of Nt is given by
_Nt
Nt
=
(
1 

 

+
_Zt
Zt

Nt
2=(1 )l
   if Nt < N
1 

   Nt
2=(1 )l
   if Nt > N
)
. (24)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following Lemma provides the steady-state values of Nt = N and gt = g as well as
the parameter restrictions that ensure N 2 (0; N) and g > 0.23
Lemma 4 Under the parameter restrictions that 1 

   <  < (1 )(1 )

,24 the economy
is stable and has a positive and unique steady-state value of Nt as well as a positive
and unique steady-state growth rate given by
N =

(1  ) (1  )

  

2=(1 )l
(1  )   > 0, (25)
g = 

(1+)=(1 )(1  ) l

N
  

   = (+ )   (1  )
(1  ) (1  )=   > 0. (26)
Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the number of rms, the market
size of each rm, economic growth and social welfare. Specically, we consider the e¤ects of
an unexpected permanent change in the nominal interest rate i. In Section 3.1, we analyze
the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of
monetary policy on social welfare.
23In this model, we have assumed zero population growth, so that Nt converges to a steady-state value.
If we assume positive population growth, it would be the number of rms per capita that converges to a
steady state instead, and our main results would be unchanged.
24This parameter restriction would depend on a larger set of parameters if we parameterize R&D produc-
tivity in (9) and the productivity in producing intermediate goods from nal goods. For simplicity, we have
implicitly normalized these productivity parameters to unity.
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3.1 E¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth
Proposition 1 provides our rst main result: an increase in the nominal interest rate i,
accompanied by an increase in the money growth rate , reduces the steady-state equilibrium
number of rms but does not a¤ect the steady-state equilibrium growth rate. Intuitively,
an increase in i reduces the supply of labor l in (21), which in turn leads to a decrease in
the steady-state equilibrium number of rms N. A reduction in labor supply decreases the
aggregate market size, which in turn induces some rms to exit the market such that the
market size of each rm remains constant in the steady state. Due to this endogeneity of
market structure, steady-state employment per rm l=N remains unchanged. As a result,
the steady-state equilibrium growth rate in (26) is independent of the nominal interest rate
i and the money growth rate .
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium number of rms is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate, but the steady-state equilibrium growth rate and rm market size are indepen-
dent of the nominal interest rate and the money growth rate.
Proof. Use (21), (25) and (26). Also, recall that i = +  in the steady state.
The above result of monetary superneutrality with respect to economic growth di¤ers
from previous studies, such as Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu et al. (2012) who nd that
an increase in the money growth rate reduces the steady-state equilibrium growth rate of
innovation. This di¤erence is due to the fact that the earlier literature uses a monetary R&D-
based growth model with an exogenous market structure. In contrast, the market structure
in our model is endogenous. Entry and exit of rms in response to prot opportunities imply
that the number of rms increases or decreases with aggregate market size. This mechanism
implies that the number of rms changes in response to endogenous changes in labor supply
leading to our result that monetary policy has no steady-state e¤ect on economic growth
and the market size of each rm.
We now show the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth along the transition
path. The model features transition dynamics because Nt is a state variable that gradually
converges to its state-state value N. When the monetary authority increases the nominal
interest rate, the equilibrium supply of labor l adjusts instantly, but the equilibrium number
of rms adjusts slowly. Given that the equilibrium growth rate is determined by rm market
size l=Nt, monetary policy can have an e¤ect on economic growth during the transition to
the steady state. Proposition 2 shows that an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces
the growth rates of vertical innovation, output and consumption on the transition path.
Figure 1 illustrates the transitional e¤ects of a permanent increase in the nominal interest
rate at time t.
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Proposition 2 An increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the growth rates of vertical
innovation, output and consumption on the transition path.
Proof. Use (21), (22) and (23). Also, recall that Nt is a state variable.
Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces labor supply, which adjusts
instantly and leads to a temporary decrease in rm market size l=Nt. The smaller rm
market size reduces the returns to R&D in (14) and the equilibrium growth rate in (23).
Over time, the smaller aggregate market size determined by l induces some rms to leave
the market. As a result, rm market size l=Nt gradually increases and returns to the initial
level at which point, the equilibrium growth rate also returns to the initial level as shown in
Figure 1.
This transitional dynamic analysis of the e¤ects of monetary policy is novel relative to
previous studies, such as Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), Funk and Kromen (2010), Chu and
Cozzi (2013) and Chu and Lai (2013), which focus on the steady-state equilibrium growth
rate. Given that real world data is a¤ected by both transitional and steady-state e¤ects,
having theoretical results on the characteristics of transition dynamics could be helpful for
formulating empirically testable hypotheses.
3.2 E¤ects of monetary policy on social welfare
In this subsection, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Specically, we consider
the e¤ects of a permanent change in the nominal interest rate at time 0 on ow utility lnut
at any arbitrary time t  0. We show that @ lnut=@i < 0, which is su¢ cient for @U=@i < 0
because U =
R1
0
e t lnutdt. Taking the log of (19), we obtain
lnYt =
2
1   ln  + lnZt + ln lt =
2
1   ln  +
Z t
0
gsds+ ln l
, (27)
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where we have normalized Z0 = 1. Taking the log of (20), we obtain
ln ct = ln(1   + 2) + lnYt. (28)
Therefore, an increase in the nominal interest rate at time 0 decreases the levels of output
and consumption at any arbitrary time t > 0 through two channels. First, it reduces the
supply of labor l. Second, it temporarily reduces the growth rate of technology, which
decreases the level of technology in the future.
Proposition 3 An increase in the nominal interest rate at time 0 decreases the levels of
output and consumption at any arbitrary time t > 0.
Proof. Use Proposition 2 and (21) in (27) and (28).
Substituting (27) and (28) into ow utility lnut in (1) and then di¤erentiating it with
respect to i yield
@ lnut
@i
=
Z t
0
@gs
@i
ds| {z }
 
+
@ ln l
@i| {z }
 
+ 
@ ln(L  l)
@i| {z }
+
. (29)
An increase in the nominal interest rate i thus has three e¤ects on social welfare. First, it
reduces welfare by temporarily decreasing the growth rates of vertical innovation, output and
consumption. Second, it reduces welfare by decreasing the levels of output and consumption
through a decrease in labor supply l. Third, it improves welfare by increasing leisure L  l.
The rst two e¤ects dominate the third e¤ect because the loss of consumption dominates
the gain in leisure so that @ lnut=@i < 0. Intuitively, the supply of labor is suboptimally
low in equilibrium partly because the CIA constraint imposes an extra cost on consumption
relative to leisure. To see this result,
@ ln l
@l
+ 
@ ln(L  l)
@l
=
L  (1 + )l
l(L  l) > 0 (30)
because L=(1+) > l in (21). As a result, a positive nominal interest rate that reduces labor
supply is suboptimal. We summarize these welfare implications in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Social welfare is decreasing in the nominal interest rate; therefore, the Fried-
man rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate) is socially optimal in this economy.
Proof. Use (29) and (30). Also, recall from (21) that @l=@i < 0.
Previous studies, such as Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) and Chu and Lai (2013), also nd
that the Friedman rule is optimal in the R&D-based growth model.25 However, these studies
focus on steady-state welfare. To our knowledge, our result is the rst analytical derivation
of optimal monetary policy that takes into account the endogeneity of market structure and
transition dynamics in the equilibrium growth rate of an R&D-based growth model.
25See Chu and Cozzi (2013) for an analysis on the suboptimality of the Friedman rule in the Schumpeterian
growth model with a CIA constraint on R&D investment.
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4 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth, social
welfare and market structure in a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market
structure. Unlike previous studies that analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic
growth either in an AK-type growth model or in the rst-generation R&D-based growth
model, this study analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy in a second-generation R&D-based
growth model in which we have obtained novel results and richer implications. A novel result
is that monetary policy has a negative e¤ect on economic growth only in the short run; in
the long run, monetary policy has no e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate because of the
endogenous response of the economys market structure to changes in labor supply induced
by monetary policy. In other words, we nd that money is superneutrality with respect
to economic growth. This result highlights the importance of endogenous market structure
and di¤ers from previous studies that analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy in R&D-based
growth models with exogenous market structure. Furthermore, we analyze optimal monetary
policy by analytically deriving the complete changes in welfare along the transition path and
nd that the Friedman rule is socially optimal in this economy.
A potential direction for future research is to investigate the e¤ects of monetary policy
on economic growth and social welfare in a growth-theoretic framework in which R&D en-
dogenously alters the importance of labor as a factor of production. The behavior of labor
is central to our results, so a model in which the importance of labor changes as a result of
R&D might deliver interesting new insights into the relation between money and economic
growth. See Peretto and Seater (2013) for the recent development of such a model without
money.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (8), (10) and (11) into (13) yields
Ht(j) = 

Zt (j)Z
1 
t lt=Nt
1 
[Xt(j)]
  Xt(j)  Zt (j)Z1 t  Rt(j) + qt(j)Rt(j). (A1)
The rst-order conditions include
@Ht(j)
@Xt(j)
= 0, pt(j) = 

Zt (j)Z
1 
t lt=Nt
Xt(j)
1 
=
1

, (A2)
@Ht(j)
@Rt(j)
= 0, qt(j) = 1, (A3)
@Ht(j)
@Zt(j)
= (1  )

Zt (j)Z
1 
t lt=Nt
1 
[Xt(j)]

Zt(j)
 Z 1t (j)Z1 t = rIt qt(j)  _qt(j). (A4)
Substituting (A2) and (A3) into (A4) yields
rIt = 
h
(1  )(1+)=(1 )lt=Nt   
i
, (A5)
where we have applied Zt(j) = Zt.
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting  t = _mt + tmt into (2) yields
_at = rtat + wtlt   ct. (A6)
Then, substituting (15) into at = VtNt yields
at = XtNt = 
ptXtNt
pt
= 2Yt, (A7)
where the last equality uses (A2) and ptXtNt = Yt. Substituting (A7) into (A6) yields
_Yt
Yt
=
_at
at
= rt +
wtlt   ct
2Yt
. (A8)
Substituting the Euler equation and wtlt = (1  )Yt into (A8) yields
_ct
ct
 
_Yt
Yt
=
ct=Yt
2
 

1  
2
+ 

. (A9)
Therefore, the dynamics of ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability such that ct=Yt
must jump to its steady-state value in (20).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (10), (11), (15) and (A2) into (16) yields
rEt =
1  

  Zt +Rt
Xt
+
_Xt
Xt
, (A10)
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where we have applied Zt(j) = Zt and _Vt=Vt = _Xt=Xt. Substituting (A2) into (8) yields
Xt = 
2=(1 )Zt
l
Nt
. (A11)
Substituting (9) and (A11) into (A10) yields
rEt =
1  

 
 
+
_Zt
Zt
!
Nt
2=(1 )l
+
_Zt
Zt
 
_Nt
Nt
, (A12)
where we have used _Xt=Xt = _Zt=Zt   _Nt=Nt. Setting rEt = rt and substituting (22) into
(A12) yield the dynamics of Nt given by
_Nt
Nt
=
1  

 
 
+
_Zt
Zt
!
Nt
2=(1 )l
  . (A13)
Equation (A13) describes the dynamics of Nt when Nt < N  
(1+)=(1 )(1 )
+=
l. When
Nt > N , _Zt=Zt = 0 as shown in (23).
Proof of Lemma 4. This proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove that under  <
min
n
(1  ), (1 )(1 )

o
, there exists a stable, unique and positive steady-state value of
Nt. Then, we prove that under  > 1    , the growth rate of vertical innovation is
strictly positive. Finally, the above parameter conditions can be merged into 1 

   <
 < (1 )(1 )

, which ensures (1 )(1 )

< (1 ). We consider the equilibrium under which
there is positive in-house R&D. Substituting (23) into the rst equation of (24) yields
_Nt
Nt
=
  (1  )
2=(1 )l
Nt +
(1  )(1  )

  . (A14)
Because Nt is a state variable, the dynamics of Nt is stable if and only if  < (1   ).
Solving _Nt = 0, we obtain the steady-state value of Nt in an economy with positive in-house
R&D.
N =

(1  )(1  )

  

2=(1 )l?
(1  )   . (A15)
Given  < (1  ), (A15) shows that N > 0 if and only if
 <
(1  )(1  )

. (A16)
Combining  < (1  ) and (A16) yields
 < min

(1  ), (1  )(1  )


. (A17)
Substituting (A15) into (23) yields (26). Given (A16), (26) shows that g > 0 if and only if
 > 1 

  .
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